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Abstract 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) are agreements where public bodies enter into long term contractual with private entities 
for construction or management the public sector facilities, or provision services to the community. Internal rate of return 
(IRR), pay back regime or tariff, and the concession period (CP) are essential items to success (PPP) projects. This research 
presents a systematic approach for a win-win partnership contract determined on a quantitative basis, by informing the 
partnership parties how long contract period should be made.  Essence of the proposed methodology is that project 
completion time should allow a competent contractor to complete the project on schedule and operation period should be 
long enough to enable the concessionaire to achieve a reasonable return, but not too long such that concessionaire’s return 
is excessive and public sector’s interests are sacrificed. A case study of a PPP project in Mayoralty of Baghdad was 
conducted to evaluate performance of the developed mathematical models. The determined concession period (CP) has 
found to be approximately equal to actual concession period (CP) granted to the private sector.  Evaluation shows the 
possibility to adopt the proposed approach to determine the concession period (CP) more effectively. Instead of 
opportunism policy, the proposed methodology enables local government of Baghdad province to enhance its policies of 
awarding the partnership projects to increase private sector participation in infrastructure development. Finally, the 
proposed method can be used by investment practitioners as a decision support tool for contract concession period (CP), 
and is worth popularizing to design the contracted concession period (CCP) for partnership projects in Iraq, and also can 
use as a methodology to assess the critical aspects which related to partnership projects in general. 
Keywords: Concession Period (CP); Public Private Partnerships; Net Present Value; Operation Time; Investment Capital Cost; Investment 
Projects; PPP Projects. 
 
1. Introduction 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have become a major scheme in delivering public infrastructure at the last decades. 
This is because of public budget constraints and severe need for new or rehabilitated infrastructure. So, many of 
governments have fostered private sector involvement in public investment projects [1]. 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are  “agreements where public sector bodies enter into long-term contractual 
agreements with private entities for construction or management of public sector infrastructure facilities, or provision of 
services by the private sector to the community on behalf of a public sector entity’’. A fair distribution of benefits and 
risks is one of key factors in deciding concession period and an important prerequisite for cooperation between 
governments and the private sectors in a (PPP) project [2]. Financing projects of public infrastructure by private firms 
leads to format entities of partnership between public private sectors [3]. 
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Worldwide experiences have shown that partnerships can provide variety benefits to governments, in particular, 
increase “value for money” spent for infrastructure services such as [4]: 
 Apply more reliable and efficient services in lower cost; 
 Enhance the infrastructure services in term of higher quality and prompt; 
 Promote the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by the increasing of employment opportunities. 
In China, (PPP) projects improve living situation for society and keep the public sector budget deficiencies down. 
This is by transferring the risks that related to construction, finance, and operation of infrastructure projects to the private 
sector [4]. Public Private Partnership (PPP) were adopted throughout the world for delivering public infrastructure. 
Despite the worldwide experience was shown that PPP can provide a variety of benefits to the government, to fully gain 
them several critical aspects related to a PPP project need to be managed, among these the determination of concession 
period (CP) and risks that associated with it [5]. 
Therefore, there are several critical aspects related to a PPP project need to be considered. Among of these: evaluate 
and manage risks that associated with the partnership projects; identification strategies of risk analysis and settle; 
definition an adequate financial plan; assignment a most suitable concessionaire; and assignment the concession period 
(CP). To support the decision processes, the researchers were proposed many of models, tools and conceptual techniques 
which relate to these aspects [6]. 
Uncertainty that inherent in construction industry always invites us to study and analyze the potential risks of project. 
It is needed to adopt an effective methodology take into account the uncertainty and risk of the Partnership projects [5].  
Each partnership based on concession period (CP), which may be fixed or extendable. The type of concession period 
specifies according to the risks which act on the key factors of investment such as schedule time, initial capital cost, 
annual operation and maintenance cost, and the expected revenues. 
The period will be a fixed, in which risk factors usually managed through the tariff regime or controlled by other 
measures. In contrast of that, concession will have an extendable period if risk factors would be worse or better than the 
expected circumstances. For instance, in order to treat the unsecured project schedule time, the concession period (CP) 
can be extendable according to the project completion time. Where, If the contractor has delivered the project ahead of 
the expected schedule time, the concession period (CP) will be more than which contracted. This will allow 
concessionaire and government earn more return, and vice versa [5]. 
Therefore, there is an urgent need to adopt a scientific and practical methodology provide an optimal concession 
period (CP) for the Iraqi construction industry as a best chance that creates a win–win solution for both the government 
and concessionaire. The optimal concession period (CP) allows a fair risk sharing between the two parties. In other 
words, the concession period (CP) should protected the rights of the parties by guaranteeing for both a fairly allocate of 
profit and risks between parties. 
The researcher aims to propose a methodology for determination the concession period (CP) based on a public– 
private win–win principle. That is, the concession period (CP) should be long enough to enable concessionaire to achieve 
a reasonable return on its investment, but not extravagant of the concessionaire’s interests at the expense of public sector. 
2. Research Methodology 
This research paper concerns with the identification of concession period (CP) in construction industry. To approach 
a proper solution of this problem, a step by step methodology was adopted. The researchers begin a definition of 
concession period. Then illustrating the risks related to planning and designing the concession period (CP), into pre 
construction stage and operation phase of project life cycle. 
Terminologies of concession period (CP) were then discussed to match their applicability for designation an optimal 
concession period (OCP). Based on literature review and fundamentals of engineering economy, the researchers 
developed mathematical models. To investigate the application ability of proposed methodology a case study was 
conducted among (PPP) projects. After filed data was collected, analysis was done. Finally, results were discussed in 
light of Iraqi construction industry. As given the flow chart below. Preceding paragraphs have been summarized in 
Figure 1. to show steps followed in this research. 
3. Concession Period 
The partnership between public and private sectors usually addressed to provide public works and services through 
concession arrangements. One of most important issues to be addressed in public private sectors partnership is the 
concession period (CP). This is because of concession period (CP), to some extent, demarcates rights and responsibilities 
between public and private sectors during the project’s life cycle. So, the concession period (CP) is critical to project’s 




sustainable development, where it should be based on a win–win principle for parties involved and exercises simulation 





































Figure 1. The research methodology 
Another form of the concession period (CP), it begins at completion of the construction. And the concessionaire can 
still operate the project once completed if the project is completed behind schedule. There are also a few examples of 
concessions whose terms are variable depending on recover period of the investment capital cost and the interest rate at 
a certain level of interior rate of return [8]. 
Although, there may be a mechanism for extending it for a limited additional period to compensate the concessionaire 
for risks it is not prepared to bear. But a long-term fixed concession period (CP) is most common approach. In the 
former, the concession period (CP) starts when construction begins. For example, some of roads in United Kingdom 
delivered by the system of (Design–Build–Finance–Operate) have a fixed concession period (CP) of (30) years. Also, 
there are legislative provisions in some countries limiting duration length of infrastructure concessions such as, 
 The concession period assigned to a maximum number of years; 
 The concession period expires as soon as investment capital cost of the concessionaire has been repaid at a 
reasonable level of revenue; 
 The concession period expires as soon as achieve a certain level of production or usages without taking into 
consider the number of years. 
For example, the Dartford bridge project has a maximum concession period (CP) of 20 years, within which facilities 
of the project are required to be handed back to the government once debt charges and other costs have been recovered 
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[9]. Some studies have been conducted in Canada to settle problems common to traditional government PSA projects, 
and supposedly absent from PPP arrangements, are still there, only much harder to discern [11]. 
It is more likely to be used a renegotiable concession period (RCP). The renegotiable concession period (RCP) usually 
named to deal with many aspects such as; the uncertainty inherent in construction industry, scope of the project has not 
been clearly defined, the construction activities of infrastructure project usually very complex with substantial risks 
(e.g., overruns the cost and duration), and also the operation cash flows usually very difficult to be predicted in future 
[11]. 
Investment projects may incur many different cash flow profiles during their life cycle. Usually requires an investing 
a large amount of initial capital cost to construct the partnership infrastructure facilities, so these investment capital cost 
should be recovered by revenues of project over the contracted concession period (CCP). For public bodies, one of most 
important issues that considering when using a PPP scheme to develop a particular infrastructure project, is the 
determination of an appropriate concession period (CP) to the private partner. This concession period (CP) will be named 
base on a number of key factors, such as type of partnership, number and complexity of construction activities that 
related with the partnership project, economical life of the project facility, structure of the initial capital investment for 
the concessionaire, and volatility of revenue when operation in the future. So, all these uncertainties and risks during the 
construction period and the future operation period have significant effects on the concession period (CP) [12]. 
Public private partnership (PPP) as an alternative financing mechanism has been widely applied in the construction 
of public infrastructure projects and may provide new funding sources for building new infrastructure. Governments 
should take detailed information into consideration at the initial project stage when determining the concession period. 
In Iraq public bodies usually preset the concession period (CP) to a fixed length because of it is subject to bureaucratic 
procedures. This will prompt the concessionaire to bid the project on a high ceiling of guarantees to achieve a certain 
level of internal rate of return. This practice, however, induces the frequent failure or renegotiation of concession 
contracts. This because it does not lead to select the concessionaires an efficiently. To overcome these problems, 
governments need to use a methodology that appropriately calculates the concession period (CP) [13]. 
Concession period (CP) begins at the moment of signed the contract or agreement between the government and the 
private sector, indicating period within which the concessionaire is responsible for construction and operation the 
project. Concession period (CP) is a key decision in the arrangement of partnership contract. The length of concession 
period (CP) is mainly related to recovery of investment capital cost and required profit by the concessionaires. The 
determining concession period (CP) should base on win-win principle. For that concession period (CP) should be long 
enough to allow concessionaire to recover investment capital costs and then earn reasonable profits within that [5]. 
Generally, a long concession period (CP) is beneficial to the private investor, but a prolonged concession period (CP) 
may induce loss to concerned government. Alternatively, the short concession period (CP) leads to either reject the 
contract or be forced to increase the service fees in the operation phase. Consequently, risk burden due to a short 
concession period (CP) will be shifted to the party who uses and pays for the facilities. Therefore, named a reasonable 
concession period (CP) is a key factor for success the PPP projects [14]. 
Many developed models had defined the concession period (CP) as interval of time which been agreed by the 
governments. Also, some of methodologies calculated the concession period (CP) as a specific period of time within 
which the concession must be end [5]. 
Most of the developed models in the literature review were used the present value of cash flow (NPV) as a parameter 
to designation concession period (CP) of the partnership. Some of these adopted the least method of present value for 
revenue (LPVR) to determine the concession period (CP). This mean the method would consider the maximization of 
the concessionaire's benefits only. Also, some of models developed the concession period (CP) by maximize benefits of 
both government and concessionaire through the win-win approach [15]. 
Other researchers adopted a Fuzzy Delphi technique to calculate the uncertainty parameters of the concession period 
(CP). In particular, determine the values of different uncertain factors that effect on the partnership projects by 
considering the opinions of experts, and then calculate the NPV value by taking into account the resulted aggregated 
values of uncertain input parameters, finally determination the concession period (CP) using the fuzzy approach. The 
proposed methodology offers a fuzzy number for the concession period (CP). Also, a fuzzy of multi objective decision 
model was developed to assess the most satisfactory of concession options for the PPP projects [16]. 
Through the literature review, the researcher identified two main aspects to designation the concession period (CP) 
are: the first one concern for determination the concession period (CP), which classified for two main categories: 
 Models allow determining the concession as instant of time; 
 Models calculate the concession period (CP) as a range period within which the concession contract must end. 
 




The second aspect involves the uncertainties and risk factors affecting PPP projects. By study the literature, it was found 
models which do not take into account the risks and uncertainties that affect over a long of period many input the 
variables to calculate the concession period (CP) as a deterministic time. While, the models in which uncertainties are 
accounted modeled by a statistical distribution and the concession period (CP) is determined by using simulation 
methods. 
Finally, the third aspect concerns the perspective adopted in calculating concession period (CP), in terms of safeguard 
and party to satisfy. In this respect, from the point of private partner view, the models should provide a long enough 
concession period in order to allow the concessionaire to obtain an abundant level of revenues. 
In contrast, some researchers proposed a win-win approach in order to satisfy the multiple interests of public sector 
and the profitability benefits of the private sector. It was determining the concession period (CP) by takes into account 
both the government and investor interest perspective.  
Many of these studies applied the win–win approach in different ways. For example, the win-win approach was 
implemented by posing the following two constraints; concessionaire acts in the interest of the government, and the 
concession should be long enough to allow the concessionaire to obtain a reasonable interior rate of retain. The 
responsibilities of concessionaire may act on improve efficiency, cost effectiveness, and service quality, sustain a stable 
and continuously public affordable price regime, and transfer excessive profits to the government [17]. 
Hanaoka and Palapus (2012), employed the bargaining theory to design a reasonable concession period (CP). Thus, 
the concession period (CP) had been considered as a negotiation process wherein; public bodies and private sectors 
entities act as parties to adopt a partnerships deal, benefit to be generated within the concession period (CP) interval 
within which the end of concession period (CP) could occur, is the conflict of interest, and the negotiation will not end 
until an agreement of both partnership parties are reached [18]. 
4. Risks Affecting the Concession Period 
It is obvious that determination of an appropriate concession period (Tcp) requires a good estimation for construction 
period (Tc) and operation period (To). Construction period (Tc) dependents upon; the duration of various construction 
activities, their relationships, planning, and scheduling of project.  
The construction projects are uniquely and uncertainties usually inherent in it. Complexity of the infrastructure 
projects typically requires a huge amount of investment cost. So, many of parties participate for many aspects of these 
types of projects. These because of the infrastructure projects are involving more risks than other types of projects 
regarding either external risks or internal risks [19]. 
According to (American Consulting Engineers Council and Associated General Contractors of America 1998), 
"various risks may occur in the construction project site, relationships of contractual parties, contractual arrangements, 
technical specifications, and other areas. These include archaeological discoveries; the time of resolve the problems in 
construction sites, unpredicted environmental conditions during the construction process, get of licenses, approved the 
permits, and the subsurface conditions (e.g., difficult soils, rock, groundwater, and underground utilities); design 
changes; extreme weather or natural disasters; insufficiency of plans and specifications; construction cost escalation; 
inadequacy of resources (e.g., labor force, material, funding); changes in legal requirements; delays in delivery of critical 
equipment and supplies; labor strife and (or) jurisdictional disputes; political involvement and interference; 
subcontractor capability; protracted disputes; and third-party litigation" [10]. So, the project completion time or (Tc) 
affected by these risks.  
Operation period (To) depend on the development cost of project as well as net present value (NPV) of the annual 
revenues for all long of the operation period. (NPV) is defined as presently equivalent value for construction activities 
costs (Construction Capital Cost CCC). The various construction risks mentioned above may also greatly increase the 
project development cost. (NPV) depends on the construction period (Tc) and many risks that may be encountered in 
future operation of the project, particularly, economic risks such as service and (or) product demand (quantity and price), 
project operation and maintenance costs, exchange rate (if foreign currency is involved), interest rate, and inflation rate 
[20]. 
As explained earlier, any Partnership infrastructure project subjects to the uncertainties in planning and execution. 
Hence, it is necessary to model the project development by specified the adventure risks in order to support the decision 
makers. So, the analysis and modeling of risk leads to informed decisions for procurement the public works and services. 
Major risk variables of determination the optimal concession period are construction period (Tc), project development 
cost (NPV), market demand, sale price, project operation and maintenance costs, and discount rate (interest rate of retune 
and inflation rate) [21]. 
Multi-Party contracting and risk sharing are relatively innovative at the construction industry. Conventional approach 
of risk management, in the project delivery systems, cannot adopted in multi-Party contracting environment. 




Furthermore, this needs better understanding for the project potential risks and potential areas for reducing to earn more 
settled methods with considerations of all contracting party interests and priorities. 
5. Concession Period Analysis 
Determination of concession period (CP) lies in critical position for the successful PPP projects. The private sector 
may prefer an extended concession period in order to reap more revenue. On the contrary, the public sector would limit 
the length of concession period (LCP) to protect user’s interest. Thus, determination of a resend able concession period 
becomes a complicated decision making activity among participants, and subject to influence of many economic factors, 
such as total initial investment capital cost (IICC), toll system, and inflation rate [22].  
There are two main time variables need to identified when designation a concession period; construction period and 
operation period (Tc and To, respectively). Construction period schedules, (Tc), are always estimates because a great 
number of factors affect construction activities. Concessionaire operation period (To) is the period of recovery 
investment capital and its cost with a certain level of return based on projected revenues, which are subject to market 
risks. A short concession period (CP) means a high price for service or increase of excise during the operation period. 
High price for service or increases often faces opposition from the masses. 
Based on whether the construction period and the private operation period are defined together or separately, there 
are two concession period structures: single-period concession structure (SPCS) and two-period concession structure 
(TPCS). Therefore, designation of an appropriate concession period (CP) lies in two main axes are; an informed 
estimation for the project completion time within which an experienced contractor can complete the project on schedule, 
and an accurate prediction for operation period that allows the concessionaire to obtain a reasonable but not excessive 
level of return [23]. 
For the private concessionaire, opportunity costs in current and future markets are taken into consideration in addition 
to scope and severity of the risks which involved in the particular project thus, concession period (CP) should be long 
enough to allow the concessionaire recover its investment capital costs (ICC) and then obtain a reasonable return within 
that period. For the public client, concessionaire’s return should not be excessive compared to its commitments and 
efforts in addition to compare his revenues with available information of costs and rates of return for current and future 
markets [24].  
In addition, a PPP scheme should achieve a better result than a traditional public procurement approach. This is the 
strategy that should be behind selection of partnership by the client. United Kingdom Treasury Task Force (1999) 
"defines the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) as a technique used by the client to assign a proper service provider for 
a public sector project". It determines by estimating cost of service when delivered by the public sector itself. The public 
sector comparator is expressed in net present value terms based on the required output specifications and taking into full 
account the risks that would be encountered by that style of procurement". The public sector comparator is used many 
purposes such as determine if the project is affordable to government by ensuring full life-cycle costing at an early stage, 
test whether a public-privately partnered (PPP) project is viable and demonstrates value for money, communicate with 
partners on such key aspects as output specifications and risk allocation, and encourage broader competition by creating 
greater confidence in the bidding process. Hence, the Public Sector Comparator helps the private partnership to be more 
cost effective [25]. 
5.1. Concession Period Terminologies 
Some terms related to the analysis of concession period (CP) are defined as these words are frequently mentioned all 
throughout this study [18]. 
 Concession period (CP): is counts from the time when project owner and investor start signing the agreement. 
 Operation period: starts when the project is opened to the public and starts to generate revenues. 
 Breakeven point: it is the point where in it, the net present value equals zero. 
 Payback period: "the period that required for recovering the cost initial of investment". It ends as soon as project 
reaches the breakeven point [26]. 
 Repayment period: is the time in which the debt obligations or loans must be repaid. Repayment period may be 
longer than or equal the payback period of project and must be finished before the transfer point. 
 Transfer point (TC): any time/ year (T) between the breakeven point and the end of economic life where at which 
the ownership of project will be transferred back the client. 
 Concession period (CP) interval: it is the interval or period starting from the project's breakeven point until the end 
of economic life; period where transfer point (TC) decided based on the result of negotiation between the 
government and the private sector could occur. 




 Economic life: the period of project life that during it the project able to generate net gains. 
Figure 2 illustrates relationship among the defined terminologies. Net present value of investment capital cost 
decreases during the construction period. But, as soon as the project enters service and makes revenues, capital cost 
would be covered and achieve profits. So, this requires a long enough operational period to achieve that investment 
objective. 
6. Determine the Optimal Concession Period 
The design of contracted concession period (CCP) is calculating the instant of time within which the concession must 
end. This requires three major issues; financing flow diagram, net annual returns, and profit margin of investment capital 
cost (ICC). Also, designate the concession period (CP) should take into consider uncertainty in construct and operate 
the partnership project. In other words, concession period (CP) should be able to protect both interests of private investor 
and the client simultaneously in addition to ensure that interests of the parties are satisfied in a balanced way by win–
win principle.  
 
Figure 2. The relationship between concession period terminologies [18] 
There are two period structures when design of a concession period (CP). One is the integrated concession period 
(CP) that combines the construction period and operation period, and the other is the separated concession period (CP) 
that distinguishes the (CP) as a construction period and operation period. 
In the integrated concession period (CP), the concession period starts from the moment of signing the contract which 
fixes the length of the concession. Thus, transfers the risk of construction time overrun to the concessionaire. This means, 
the operation period is shorter if the construction period is longer, and vice versa. Hence, the concessionaire will be 
achieved profits from revenues generated by the project run when it completed ahead of schedule or otherwise severe 
the loss of revenues resulting from delayed of handover and reduced operation time.  
In the separated concession period (CP), the concessionaire has a fixed operation period regardless of actual 
completion time of construction. Possible incentive schemes include an early completion bonus (the government benefits 
a share or a percentage from the generated profit during the period ahead schedule of completion time) or delay 
completion penalty (the concessionaire bears a percentage of the losses resulting from delay of completion). Regardless 
the period structure type of contract, Figure 3 shows the two periods as a specific point of time should not be skipped. 
Figure 3. Life intervals of investment project  





According to a reasonable but not excessive principle, the concession period (Tcp) can be defined as in Equation 1. 
But, concession period (Tcp) should to meet the hypotheses’ limits in Equations 2 and 3; 
𝑇𝑐𝑝 = 𝑇𝑐 + 𝑇𝑜   (1) 
Where: 𝑇𝑐, is the project construction time; 𝑇𝑜, is the operation period of project. 
𝑇𝑐 ≤ 𝑇𝑐 𝑚𝑎𝑥. (2) 
𝑇𝑜 ≤ 𝑇𝑜 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 (3) 
Where: 𝑇𝑐 𝑚𝑎𝑥, is the maximum allowable project completion time; 𝑇𝑜 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐, is the designed economic operation 
life of the project. 
At the same time, net present value (NPV) of total project capital cost should be satisfied the hypothesis in Equation 
4: 
NPV|(1+R private sector) ≤  NPV|To =t ≤   NPV| (1+R public sector) (4) 
Where: 𝑁𝑃𝑉, is the net present value of the total project development cost; 𝑅 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟, is the minimum rate of 
return required by the private sector in the development of a certain type of projects; 𝑅 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟, it is the return 
rate of total project development cost, which should be limited by the public sector as a maximum percentage to be 
acceptable. 𝑁𝑃𝑉|𝑇 = 𝑡, is the net present value of net revenues generated from an operation period 𝑇𝑜 =  𝑡. 
As mention in the Figure 1, concession period (Tcp), is any point within the interval after completion time until end 
of economic life of the project. The optimal concession period (CP) should to adopt an appropriate time for both the 
client and private sector as below: 
To satisfy the concessionaire profits (earn reasonable return), net present value (NPV) for gross project development 
cost should achieve (at least) the minimum rate of return required by the concessionaire to develop a certain type of 
projects as illustrates in Equations 5 and 6; i.e. 
(NPV) private sector = NPV × (1+ R private sector) (5) 
As it is known, the fundamental concept of engineering economy is based on the equivalence value of money over 
time. The economic equivalence of the investor revenue after the construction finished should be: 
(NFV) private sector = (NPV) private sector × (1+ i)^Tc (6) 
Where: 𝑁𝐹𝑉, is the value of money in the future for the total project development cost, i, annual rate of discount, is the 
interest rate that charged by financial institutions for use of their money. Usually, the interest rate reflects the value of 
money over time, and the inflation as well as the risks of cash flows [26]. 
Inflation is decreasing value of money over the time. It is calculated to increase the money over time to get the same 
amount of goods or services [26]. 
The discount rate (i) can be rectified in Equation 7 as the following: 
if= i + f + i×f (7) 
Where: i, is real interest rate; f, is inflation rate. 
(NFV) private sector = (NCFt) [(1+ i)^t -1 / i×(1+ i)^t] (8) 
Where: 𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡, is the annual net cash flow of operation for each year (t); 𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡 = (Revenue or income - operation & 
maintenance cost) t. 
Then after, the Equation 9 solves for time (T), the concession period can be calculated by summation the operation 
time (T) and the completion time of project: 
Minimum Concession Period (Tcp) private sector = Tc + (To) private sector (9) 
Now satisfying the government instructions, the net present value of total project development cost should not to 
exceed value of Equations 10, 11, and 13 respectively the maximum level of profits; i.e.  
(NPV) public sector = NPV ×(1+ R public sector) (10) 
(NFV) public sector= (NPV) public sector ×(1+ i) Tc (11) 




(NFV) public sector = (NCFt) [(1+ i) t -1 / i×(1+ i) t] (12) 
After Equation 13 solves for time (To), the concession period can be calculated by summation the operation time 
(To) max and the completion time of project: 
𝑀aximum Concession Period (Tcp) public sector = Tc + (To) public sector (13) 
7. Case Studies 
The developed mathematical models have been applied to partnership projects to valid its ability to determine the 
concession period (CP). The developed mathematical models have used to calculate the optimal concession period (CP) 
of the partnership projects. The developed models allow to public sector to negotiate with the private sector on the 
principle of win-win. The principle allows to the investors a period of time to recover their capitals cost (construction 
and operating costs) and then achieve a reasonable profit margin for their investments. Taking into consideration, 
concession period (CP) of the investment should be less than the economic life of the assets after return the ownership 
to the public sector (i.e. the project should to be valid for the functional feasibility). 
The researcher applied the developed mathematical models on two partnership projects for two different sectors, one 
of it is an investment project in the tourism sector (built and operate a super deluxe hotel).  The other project is a shopping 
mall (shopping center), to the commercial sector. Subsequent paragraphs show description of a case study.  
7.1. Background 
Mayoralty of Baghdad, one of the administrative authorities of the Baghdad local government, has announced its 
desire to establish a luxury tourist hotel at the central of Baghdad to support the tourism sector. The Mayoralty launched 
the initiative for investors to submit their proposals and suggestions to design and construction the project. Also, it is 
asked the investor to operate the project for a specific concession period (CP) to recover their capital cost and profits. 
Then, return the ownership of the project to the public sector. 
The Mayoralty received several offers by various investors, the most prominent of which was design and constructs 
a luxury tourist hotel then operates it by the investor. The contract covers delivery the hotel by Turnkey delivery system 
during (24) months for a (10) years concession period. The technical feasibility study for specification of buildings 
illustrates the economic life of project is (20) years. The analysis of time period data was summarized in Figure 4. to 
illustrate the life intervals of hotel. 
Figure 4. Life intervals of hotel 
7.2. Description of Project  
The project is constructing a multi-storey building on an area of (571 m2) at central of capital. The project consists 
of (7) floors contain (4 suites, 5 VIP rooms, 29 luxury rooms, 14 double rooms, and 11 single rooms). The building also 
contains a fine dining restaurant, a swimming pool, offices, services, multifunctional and other leisure facilities. 
On the other hand, the project will be awarded by the investor to a specialized construction company to deliver the 
work by Turnkey system during (24) months for the cost of square meter unit. The investor also contracted with a 
specialized consultant to study and approve the drawings, plans, schedules, and statement methods that will submit by 
the contractor. Also, the consultant is responsible to supervise on the work process in site to ensure the compliance with 
the approved specifications. 
7.3. Analysis of Feasibility Study Records 
A retrospective study was conducted to extract data from feasibility study records of project. The feasibility study 
records are prepared by the investor. Table 1 lists the hypotheses of the proposed hotel feasibility study. The estimations 
of the operating revenues and costs had been based on historical data, data collected from similar investment projects, 
and experts' opinions. Data were analyzed to verify the investor point of view to determine the concession period (CP). 




Table 1. Hypotheses of feasibility study 
Item Percentage 
Workdays (per year) 330 days 
Insurance of lobar 30% 
Maintenance of civil works 5% 
Maintenance of equipment 5% 
Maintenance of furniture and office supplies 5% 
Maintenance of transportation means 5% 
Insurance of buildings 0.5% 
Insurance of equipment 0.5% 
Insurance of furniture and office supplies 0.5% 
Insurance of transportation means 0.5% 
Depletion of Buildings 5% 
Depletion of equipment 10% 
Depletion of furniture and office supplies 10% 
Depletion of transportation means 10% 
Sensitivity of initial capital cost 10% 
Sensitivity of operating cost 10% 
Sensitivity of annual revenue 10% 
The hypotheses which developed by the investor were also analyzed to estimate the capitals cost of construction and 
investment. Also, it had been analysis the estimation of operation and maintenance costs for the next (20 years). Table 
2 summarizes the data of feasibility study which analyzing the proposed hotel. 
The annually operation costs mainly consist of administrative expenses, operations and maintenance costs, marketing, 
insurance, and depletion fee. As well as the annual returns that expected for each operations year had been guessed. The 
revenues mainly consist of rents, long-term leases, and annual leases (such as suites, Restaurant Lounge, and pool). The 
data of analysis are summarized in the Table 3. 
Table 2. Analysis data of the feasibility study 
Item Value 
Economic life of project 20 years 
Concession period (CP) 10 years 
Capital cost (ID) 3,336,000,000 
Loan (ID) 1,452,000,000 
Construction time 2 years 
Investor margin of profit 50% 
Rate of return 8% 
Inflation rate 2% 
Recovery period 5.8 years 
Breakeven point 58% 
Table 3. Estimated the annual operations cost of project and revenues 
Item Value 
Initial Cost:  
Cost of Civil works (ID) 2,025,000,000 
Cost of Architectural works (ID) 1,473,000,000 
Cost of Electrical works (ID) 450,000,000 
Cost of Mechanical Works (ID) 250,000,000 
Cost of Furniture & Equipments (ID) 590,000,000 
Annual operating cost:  
Electrical (ID/year) 50,000,000 
Water (ID/year) 25,000,000 
Labor (ID/year) 85,000,000 




Insurance of lobar (30%) 25,000,000 
Transportation & Communication (ID/year) 25,000,000 
Fuel (ID/year) 50,000,000 
Emergency services 100,000,000 
Annual insurance cost:  
Annual insurance of buildings (ID/year) 23,000,000 
Annual insurance of equipment (ID/year) 5,000,000 
Annual insurance of furniture (ID/year) 2,000,000 
Annual insurance of transportation means (ID/year) 1,000,000 
Annual maintenance cost:  
Annual depletion (ID/year) 390,000,000 
Service of maintenance accessories (ID/year) 117,000,000 
Emergency services 250,000,000 
Expected revenue:  
Total annual revenue (ID/year) 2,500,000,000 
Net annual returns (ID/year) 1,352,000,000 
According to win-win principal the optimal concession period (CP) should to be less than the economic life of project 
(E.L.). 
𝐶. 𝑃. ≤ 𝐸. 𝑙. 
According to technical feasibility study the construction schedule of project will be (24 months). 
𝑇 construction= 2 years 
As summarized in the Table 3 above, the initial capital cost is summation of (Civil works, Electrical works, 
Mechanical Works, Construction management, Architectural, and Furniture) costs. 
Capital cost = 4788,000,000 ID 
Also, the Table 2 above illustrates, the margin of profit requires by investor is (50%). So, the net present value of 
the investor will be, 
(NPV) private sector =4788, 000,000 × (1.5) = 7182,000,000 ID 
Economic equivalence of the net present value after the construction finished will be calculated on the base of 
interest rate for the inflation (10.16%) will be: 
(NFV) private sector = 7182,000,000 × (1.1016)^2 = 8,715,519,000 ID 
From the Table 3, the annual cost will be operation & maintenance cost (Electrical & Water & Labor & 
Communication & Fuel & Transportation & Annual depletion & Service accessories). 
The net income of project estimated to be (1,352,000,000 ID) for each year of economic life period, 𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡  = 
(Revenue or income - operation & maintenance cost) t. 
8.715,519,000 = 1,352,000,000[(1.1016^𝑡 − 1) ÷ (1.1016^𝑡 × 0.1016)] 
Solve for (t), the concession period about (12 years) after the project will have been delivered. That mean the recovery 
period will be about (5.8 years). 
To satisfy the government instructions, the investor capital profit should not to exceed (35%) for these types of 
partnership in tourism sector; i.e. 
(NPV) public sector = 4,788,000,000 ×  (1.35) = 6,463,800,000 ID 
(NFV) private sector = 6,463,800,000 ×  (1.1016)^2 = 7,843,967,000 ID 
7,843,967,000 = 1,352,000,000[(1.1016^𝑡 − 1) ÷ (1.1016^𝑡 × 0.1016)] 
The concession period (CP) according to the maximum approved profit margin in public sector (to such type's 
partnership projects) is (9 years) after the project will have been delivered. 
The calculations illustrate that the breakeven analysis for the project (i.e. payback analysis period for the investor's 
capital) will be at (5.8 years) from the start time of generate revenue, according to the reasonable margin of profit from 




the investor's point of view. On the other hand, the maximum allowed percentage of profit is (35%) which by the 
government awarded such investment project to the private sector. The maximum concession period (CP) to operate the 
project is (9 years). This because, exceed of maximum percentage will not to be consistent with the social profitability 
objectives settled by administrative authorities of the government. 
It should to be noted that, the concession period (CP) calculations for both of parties of partnership must to be less 
than the economic life of the investment project. For our case, it is (20 years) according to the technical feasibility study 
of the project which prepared by the investor. According to win-win principle, the government committee entrusted with 
the concession contract must negotiate with the investor to grant the contract with not less than (5.3 years) and not more 
than (9 years). But, it should to be (12 years) from the investor commercial point of view. It should be noted here that 
the project was granted a concession period of (10 years) for the investor by the local government of Baghdad then the 
ownership will be returned to the public sector. 
8. Conclusion 
The main element of (PPP) projects is the agreement upon the concession period (CP). The concession period (CP) 
names the obligations for both public and private sectors through all life cycle of the project. Since the concession period 
is mostly determined by empirical estimation, rather than quantitative analysis, leads to personal judgments that may 
not protect the rights of the parties that arise in partnership practices. A prolonged concession period will lead to a social 
profitability’s loss that governments often seek to achieve them.  
On the other hand, a short concession period (CP) usually lead to two scenarios; either the concessionaire will be 
obliged to increase prices the service charges or fees that provide to the public. Or the investor would reject the 
partnership. So, the concession period is an important decision to arrange a successful partnership contract because its 
value decides when the ownership of project should be transferred from the private sector to the public one, thereby 
demarcating the influence, and responsibility, between the private party and the government. 
This research presents a systematic approach for a win-win partnership contract determination on a quantitative basis, 
attempting to inform the partnership parties how long the contract period should be made. The developed mathematical 
models target the concession period (CP) as a period creates a fair benefit sharing between the project promoter and the 
public bodies. In other words, the developed models try to satisfy the private and the government by guaranteeing the 
rights for both parties. 
The proposed methodology tries to enable the evaluating agency to analytically determine a concession period to be 
granted by the government to the private sector. Through, assign the concession period (CP) as a variable to the financial 
cash flow equation.  Hence, the net present value (NPV) uses as a financial viability indicator (the financial viability of 
partnership projects). 
Core of the proposed methodology is that the concession period (CP) should integrate construction and operation to 
promote innovations, effectively, capital savings, and early project completion. The project completion schedule should 
be estimated properly which allow to handle the project effectively. Also, the named operation period should be 
relevance to allow the concessionaire to achieve a reasonable profit. 
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